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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper I analyse how careerist judges formulate their decisions using 
information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from 
previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal 
to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the 
appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and 
allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the 
evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends 
on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to contradict 
previous decisions inefficiently. I also show that judges behave more efficiently when 
elected by the public than when appointed by fellow superior judges. 
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1 Introduction
Judging by the surge in recent papers counting the number of times a judge’s opinion
or article is cited (or web-searched), reputation, influence, prestige and career concerns are
essential features of the judicial world.1 This is of course not new; but, as ways of measuring
features such as prestige or influence have become more sophisticated, they have generated
a renewed interest in judicial reputation. As Posner (2000) writes,
“An even more audacious use of citations as a judicial management tool is to
grade appellate judges..the ranking is a rough guide to quality, or influence, or
reputation - it is not altogether clear which is being measured”2
Judges may care about how others perceive and rank them for two reasons. First, this
can influence their career. Although judges who have life tenure positions need not be in
fear of losing their job, promotion to a better position in the judicial system may depend on
whether others consider them as able. It is a common tradition that appellate judges are
trial judges who got promoted and Supreme Court Justices are judges from lower-echelon
appellate courts. These higher-echelon positions can increase both the judge’s pay and her
possibilities of influencing other judges. Thus, trial judges may desire to become appellate
judges, and judges of intermediate appellate courts may aspire to become judges of courts
of last resort.3 A second reason for judges to care about what others think about them, may
be a human concern for prestige and influence. In this sense, the judicial world is similar
to the scholarly academic world.
In this paper, I formalize the eﬀect of reputation seeking behavior on judicial decision
making. In particular, I assume that a judge is interested in creating a reputation for high
judicial ability, which is the ability to interpret the law correctly. Traditionally, political and
legal scholars assume either that judges try to take the right decision, i.e., to interpret the
1To name a few examples: The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the US Courts of Appeals,
by D. Klein and D. Morrisroe, JLS 1999; Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, by I.
Ayres and F. Vars, JLS 2000 ; The Most Cited Legal Scholars, by F. Shapiro, JLS 2000; The Determinants
of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, by M.
Bhattaharya and R. Smyth, JLS 2001.
2Posner, R. (2000), An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law, American Law and
Economic Review, 381-406.
3Empirical research finds that the perceived quality of a judge plays a notable part in their promotion.
For example, Salzberger and Fenn (1999) find that the promotion probability from the court of appeal to
the house of Lords in England is significantly determined by a lower reversal rate of the judge’s decision in
the house of Lords. They interpret this finding by claiming that the house of Lords believes that a lower
reversal rate indicates a better judge who deserves promotion.
1
law correctly (the ‘legal’ model), or that judges have ideological preferences and follow them
when adjudicating a case (the ‘political’ model). But some have taken reputation motives
more seriously; Landes and Posner (1976) conjecture that judges follow precedents to avoid
the disutility of being reversed whereas both Miceli and Cosgel (1994) and Whitman (2000)
assume that judges suﬀer a utility loss when being overturned by others and gain utility
when being cited. As opposed to these papers, I derive these motivations as well as aversions
endogenously, from fundamental preferences.
In other contexts, several papers model careerist decision makers, such as managers or
experts, who try to prove their ability (see for example Holmström (1982), Scharfstein and
Stein (1990), Avery and Chevalier (1999) and Levy (2003)). However, as opposed to other
types of decision makers, in the judicial system it may never be found out whether the
judge’s decision is correct or not.4 This makes the task of assessing and monitoring the
ability of the judge diﬃcult. Nevertheless, it may be possible to extract more information
about the correct decision, and consequently, about the judge’s ability, if an appeal is
brought and the case is adjudicated once more. Thus, monitoring the ability of the judge
is endogenous, because whether an appeal is brought depends on her particular decision.
The judge herself can then control the flow of information about the case and incidentally,
about her type.5
I therefore focus the analysis on judicial systems which allow for appellate review; the
judge may be subject to review by an appeals court if the losing litigant believes that her
decision is likely to be reversed.6 An important element of the analysis is that the judge
takes into consideration how her decision aﬀects the probability that the case will be brought
before a higher court. Secondly, I focus on the availability of previous decisions in similar
cases, i.e., non-binding precedent, that can assist the judge in her current decision. As in
Daughety and Reinganum (1999), judges in my model may learn some information from
decisions of other courts, often termed ‘persuasive influence’.7
These features are incorporated in the following Bayesian signaling model; a judge re-
ceives some private information regarding the application of the law in a particular case.
The accuracy of this information depends on her ability; the more able is the judge, the
4That is, whether the judge interpreted the law properly.
5 In the literature about career concerns the assumption is that the correct decision is revealed exogenously.
6The court system is often modelled as an hierarchy, for example in Spitzer and Talley (1998), Daughety
and Reinganum (2000), and Shavell (1995).
7Daughety and Reinganum (1999) assume that judges are interested in taking the right decision whereas
in my model judges are careerist. Miceli and Cosgel (1994), Whitman (2000) and Rasmusen (1994) also
analyze the use of non binding previous decisions by judges in a repeated game and focus on the evolution
of the law. My work focuses on the eﬃciency of judicial decisions.
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more ‘accurate’ is her interpretation of the law. She then delivers her decision, based both
on her private trial information and on past decisions. The losing party appeals the verdict
if the probability of reversal is greater than the cost of appeal. If an appeal is brought, an
appeals court delivers a reversal or aﬃrmation decision. I assume that the social goal is to
attain the correct decision (through eﬃcient aggregation of information) at the minimum
cost. A careerist judge, however, is not motivated by social eﬃciency, but by accumulating
reputation for being able.8 The first task of the paper is to characterize the careerist judge’s
decisions in equilibrium.
I show that in equilibrium, a careerist judge tends to contradict previous decisions more
than an eﬃcient judge would do.9 Contradicting previous decisions becomes a signal of the
judge’s ability, since able judges have accurate information of their own about the correct
interpretation of the law and do not need to rely on previous decisions. Since this signal
increases reputation, other types of judges, and in particular less able types, tend to use it
excessively and ineﬃciently.10
However, another equilibrium feature is “reversal aversion”, which arises endogenously,
because reversal signals that the judge’s decision was mistaken and reduces her reputation.
Thus, the least able types realize that if they contradict previous decisions they may be
‘caught’ by the appeals court. Therefore, less able judges cannot fully mimic the behavior
of the more able judges. This allows for an informative equilibrium even when monitoring
is endogenous and the judge cares only for reputation.
The second goal of the paper is to assess which institutional features can mitigate the
distortive behavior of the careerist judge. In particular, I consider the eﬀect of diﬀerent
nomination systems on reputation concerns and as a result on the eﬃciency of judicial
decisions. The procedure of judges’ nomination is heavily debated in many countries. In
our context, we can ask whether judges should be promoted by superior judges, or elected
by the public. Supreme Court Justices may know the correct interpretation of the law,
whereas the public or politicians can learn information about it only when appeals are
8Since the judge only cares for reputation, her decisions are cheap talk, i.e., there are no costs in her
utility function for making one decision or the other (see Crawford and Sobel, (1982)).
9An eﬃcient judge maximizes the social utility, that is, attaining the right decision at the minimum costs
of appeals. Such a judge is forward looking, and besides attempting to take the right decision, also weighs
the probability that each of her decisions would be corrected by the higher court versus the costs of an
appeal.
10The results of the model diﬀer therefore from those of Daughety and Reinganum (1999) who predict that
judges may engage in ineﬃcient herding, that is, they excessively follow previous decisions. The reason is
that in their analysis judges are interested in taking the right decision (or, what the Supreme Court perceives
as the right decision) whereas in my model judges are careerist and engage in active signaling.
3
brought. This may aﬀect the incentives of the judge and consequently her equilibrium
behavior. I therefore compare the equilibrium of the model when the judge is nominated,
as above, by the public, who may know what is the right decision only when an appeal
is brought (the case of endogenous monitoring) to the equilibrium of the model when the
judge is nominated by superior judges, who know the correct interpretation of the law
independently of appeals (the case of exogenous monitoring).
I find that the judge behaves more eﬃciently when monitoring is endogenous. The
intuition is that an endogenous monitoring system ‘punishes’ judges who contradict previous
decisions by a higher likelihood of an appeal, and therefore a higher likelihood of being
proved wrong by the higher court compared to judges who follow previous decisions. This
mitigates the incentive of the less able judges to mimic able judges who contradict previous
decisions and reduces distortion. This cannot happen with exogenous monitoring because
then the correct decision is known independently of the judge’s decision. The result implies
that the judge is reversed more often when she contradicts previous decisions if she is
appointed by fellow judges, compared to being elected by the public.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I lay out the model,
a Bayesian signaling game with incomplete and asymmetric information about the state of
the world (i.e., the correct interpretation of the law). Section 3 states the main results; I
first analyze a benchmark model in which the judge behaves eﬃciently and then investigate
the equilibrium behavior of the careerist judge. A comparison between the two types of
judges follows. In Section 4, I analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerent judicial nomination systems
on the equilibrium outcomes and also explore the eﬀect of binding precedent. Section 5
concludes. All proofs that are not in the text are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
Players and actions:
The model describes a two-tier hierarchy of a judicial process, formed of a lower-court
judge and a higher-court judge.11 The lower-court judge J must make a dichotomous
decision, d ∈ {y, n}, i.e., whether to accept the plaintiﬀ’s argument (d = y) or to reject it
(d = n).12
Given the lower-court’s decision, the losing litigant L can advance his case to the higher
11Higher-echelon courts are often composed of more than one judge. I depart from collective decision
making issues. For analysis of collective reputation problems, see Tirole (1994).
12Note that many judicial decisions are dichotomous in nature. Also, each decision may be viewed as a
collection of binary decisions, i.e., whether some evidence is valid or not. Thus, the model could be applied
to any of these ‘mini-decisions’. On the binary nature of judicial decisions, see Kornhauser (1992).
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court by bringing an appeal. Thus, L0s action is to appeal or not. An appeal is costly; the
cost is a random variable c, c ∼ U [0, 1], where each side has to bear c. For simplicity, I
assume that the costs are not known prior to the lower-court judge’s decision. The costs
are realized by the litigants only after the decision is made.13
If L brings an appeal, the higher court H adjudicates the case. H must decide whether
to aﬃrm (A) the decision of J or to reverse it (R), i.e., dh ∈ {A,R}.14 Define the final
decision D, as D = d if dh = A or if no appeal took place, and D = d0 for d0 6= d, if dh = R.
The adjudication process ends if no appeal is brought, or, after the higher court’s ruling.
There is one additional player in the game, the evaluator, E, who represents the group
that the judge would like to impress. The evaluator observes the judicial process and forms
beliefs on the ability of the lower-court judge, as explained below. I analyze a one-shot
game, i.e., the adjudication of one legal case.
The information structure:
The underlying state of the world is w, which could be either y or n,with the interpre-
tation that the correct decision in state y is d = y and in state n is d = n. The underlying
state of the world represents the correct interpretation of the law, about which there is
asymmetric information.
Earlier decisions by other courts in similar cases (‘persuasive influence’) can provide
information about w. Assume, without loss of generality, that the body of previous decisions
indicates that the correct decision is y and is accurate with probability q ∈ (.5, 1). The prior
belief of the players about the state of the world is therefore that Pr(w = y) = q, where Pr
stands for probability. The modelling of previous decisions as imperfect information about
the current case has several interpretations. First, the current case may be only partially
similar to previous cases. The parameter q can measure then the degree of similarity
between cases. Second, norms, conventions and other conditions may have changed, and q
may reflect the degree of relevance of past decisions to the current case.15
13The assumption that costs are uncertain implies that the judge views appeals as uncertain. If c is known
in advance, it adds another parameter to the model, but the nature of the results would still be maintained.
14The lower-court and the higher-court may represent either two appellate courts (intermediate and a
court of last resort), or, it may represent a trial court and an appellate court. Daughety and Reinganum
(2000) analyze a judicial system in which a trial court is engaged in fact finding whereas the appellate court
interprets the law. They reject the idea that a trial court is Bayesian and oﬀer an axiomatic decision making
approach.
15As explained in the introduction, these previous decisions represent non-binding precedent, that is,
either decisions of lower-echelon courts or situations in which the judge has enough discretion to determine
whether precedent applies. In the latter interpretation, q may also represent whether the precedent is broad
or narrow in its scope.
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I assume that the information about earlier decisions is common knowledge.16 The
players may diﬀer however in the amount of additional private information they possess
about w.
The information of the judge: while adjudicating the case, the judge receives a private
signal s ∈ {y, n} about the correct interpretation of the law. The signal may comprise
information that she receives from witnesses and lawyers, as well as some ‘hard’ evidence.
The accuracy of the signal depends on the ability of the judge to interpret the law or to
understand the evidence correctly. Let Pr(s = w|w) = t for t ∈ [.5, 1]. For example, if the
judge’s ability is t = .5, her signal is not informative about the true state of the world. If
t = 1, her signal is always accurate.
Given the prior q, and her own information (s, t), the judge forms the following posterior
beliefs, according to Bayes rule:
Pr(w = y|s, t, q) =



tq
tq+(1−t)(1−q) if s = y,
(1−t)q
(1−t)q+t(1−q) if s = n


 (1)
where Pr(w = n|s, t, q) = 1− Pr(w = y|s, t, q).
The litigants’ information: the information that the litigants possess when they decide
whether to appeal includes the judge’s decision (d), the prior (q), and the cost (c).17
The information of the higher court: I assume that the higher court H knows the state
w, that is, the correct interpretation of the law. Thus, H can make a fully informed reversal
or aﬃrmation decision once the case is brought for an appeal.
The information of the evaluator: E0s action is to form beliefs about the expected
ability of the judge. His prior belief about the ability of the judge is captured by a uniform
distribution on [.5, 1] and is common knowledge. E also knows the prior q, and the action
d of the judge. Finally, E can glean information from the judicial process. That is, when
an appeal is brought, E can observe dh ∈ {A,R}. This implies that E0s information about
w is endogenous. He can learn w only when an appeal is brought, an event which depends
on the judge’s and the litigants’ behavior.18 Denote E0s posterior beliefs about t by τ .
REMARK 1 Apart from the common prior, the higher court knows ‘everything’ (about
w), the litigants and the evaluator know ‘nothing’, and the lower-court judge knows ‘some-
16This is not an important assumption. Similar results would hold if all the players held some beliefs
about q or if J only would know q.
17For simplicity, the litigants do not have private information about the state of the world (see remark 1).
18The evaluator is likely to represent the public or politicians, who elect judges, but do not have an
independent knowledge about the interpretation of the law. They can only learn from public opinions
published for example by the Supreme Court.
6
thing’ about w. The important assumption is that the lower-court judge has some private
information about her type that the evaluator tries to assess. The rest is not important. In
particular, the litigants can have some information,19 and the higher court need not have
perfect information. Thus, I make the assumptions which are the simplest to analyze.
Objectives:
The judge J cares about her reputation. She maximizes the expected beliefs about her
ability t as perceived by E. Her objective function is therefore E(τ). Thus, siding with the
plaintiﬀ or the defendant is a cheap talk action for the judge, since it has no direct bearing
on her utility.
The higher court H maximizes the probability that the right decision is taken (or, in
other words, that the law is interpreted correctly). As a result, H simply takes dh = A if
d = w and dh = R otherwise. The assumption that the higher court is not careerist is for
simplicity, in order to focus on the lower-court judge.20
Let the litigants value a favorable decision at 1 and an unfavorable decision at 0. The
litigants when deciding whether to bring an appeal, evaluate the expected benefits of an
appeal, i.e., the probability that the decision d would be reversed, relative to its cost. Denote
the probability of dh = R given a decision d and the information of L by Pr(R|d, q). Thus,
the utility function that the losing litigant perceives is max{0, E(Pr(R|d, q))− c}.
I do not attribute any utility function to the evaluator. Rather, I assume that E updates
his beliefs about the ability of the judge rationally, using Bayes rule.21
Finally, for welfare analysis purposes, I define the social utility function. Assume that
society values a correct decision at 1 and places a weight 0 on an incorrect decision. Society
cares about achieving the correct final decision (D) at the minimum costs. Thus, the social
utility function is E(Pr(D = w) − 2θc), where θ ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing how much
society cares about costs relative to taking the right decision22 and 2c is the cost incurred
by both sides.23 Note that the litigants, who choose whether to appeal, do not necessarily
do so according to the social utility but according to their own preferences.24
Timing, strategies, and equilibrium:
The structure of the game is as follows:
19 If the litigants have perfect information, then the game becomes a game with exogenous monitoring,
i.e., it implies that the evaluator would also have perfect information. This case is analyzed in section 4.1.
The main result (Proposition 3) is robust to this assumption as well.
20Analogous qualitative results would hold if the higher court would be motivated by reputation concerns.
21This can be justified by the evaluator trying to promote the most able judges.
22The parameter θ could also represent delay aversion.
23There is a slight abuse of notation since the expectation indicator is with respect to both w and c.
24This makes the result more general. If θ = 12 , then the litigants behave eﬃciently.
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Stage 1: J chooses d ∈ (y, n).
Stage 2: L decides whether to appeal or not.
Stage 3: If L appeals, H takes an action dh ∈ {A,R}.
Stage 4: E forms beliefs τ on t.
The strategy of L is a binary decision whether to appeal given q, d, and c. The strategy
of H is dh : {d,w} → {A,R}. The strategy of E is a belief updating function τ : ΩE →
[.5, 1] where ΩE represents the information set of E. In particular, it is the prior uniform
distribution over t, and either {q, d} or {q, d, dh}. Finally, J 0s strategy is a decision function
δ : (q, s, t)→ {y, n}.
The equilibrium concept is that of a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, where beliefs are
derived from the players’ strategies and the strategies are best responses to these beliefs.
I focus on informative equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the judge’s decision is contingent
on her information and ignore ‘mirror’ equilibria, in which the meaning of the actions is
reversed.
3 Results
Let us consider first the actions of H and L in equilibrium. The optimal action of H, who
is motivated by taking the correct decision, is to aﬃrm the decision of J if d = w and to
reverse it otherwise. The losing litigant L knows therefore that the decision d is more likely
to be reversed when it is wrong and has to update his beliefs about the state of the world.
To do so, he can use the information about q, and his conjecture about the strategy of J in
equilibrium.
Let qd(δ) denote the posterior probability, updated by L, that the state of the world
is indeed d, given a decision d, previous decisions summarized by q, and δ, which is the
conjecture of L about the strategy of J. qd(δ) is calculated as follows:
qd(δ) ≡ Pr(w = d|q, d, δ) = Pr(w = d|q) · Pr(d|w = d, δ)
Pr(w = d|q) · Pr(d|w = d, δ) + Pr(w = d0|q) · Pr(d|w = d0, δ)
where Pr(w = d|·) is a shorthand for the probability with which w and d are the same.
Thus, the litigants view the decision d as a signal about w with accuracy qd(δ). Since the
probability that a decision is reversed is the probability that the judge is wrong, the litigants
appeal if
1− qd(δ) > c
Given any decision d, and the uniform distribution of costs on [0, 1], the probability of
an appeal is 1− qd(δ), and its expected cost is E(c|c < 1 − qd(δ)) = 1−qd(δ)2 . Note that in
equilibrium, qd(δ) is based on the correct conjecture of the judge’s strategy.25
25When no confusion occurs, I write qd and drop the conjecture δ.
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3.1 Benchmark: eﬃcient judge
Before analyzing the equilibrium with a careerist judge, I analyze the behavior of an eﬃcient
judge. This can serve as a benchmark for the analysis. An eﬃcient judge adjudicates the
case with the goal of maximizing social welfare, i.e., she maximizes E(Pr(D = w)− 2θc).26
The parameters characterizing the solution for an eﬃcient judge are {q, θ}. Note that the
evaluator plays no role in such an environment.
As a first step, consider what happens if no appeals are allowed, i.e., the decision of the
judge is the final decision. When J takes y, her expected utility is the posterior probability
that her decision is correct, i.e., Pr(w = y|q, s, t). Similarly, if she takes n, her expected
utility is Pr(w = n|q, s, t). Thus, J takes y for all (s, t) such that Pr(w = y|q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w =
n|q, s, t) and otherwise she takes n. By Bayes rule, she takes y whenever s = y, or when
s = n and t < q.27 This behavior can be summarized by a cutoﬀ point strategy, with a
cutoﬀ point (se, te), so that when Pr(w = y|q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y|q, se, te) the judge takes y
and otherwise she takes n.28
It is best to describe such a cutoﬀ strategy in the following figure, which will accompany
us throughout the analysis. The right part of the graph describes the judge’s decision when
s = n, for t ranging from .5 to 1. The left part of the graph, describes the judge’s decision
when s = y, and t ranges from .5 (in the middle) to 1 (in the left). Thus, as we go from
left to right, Pr(w = n|s, t) increases, from probability of 0 at s = y and t = 1, through
probability 12 at t =
1
2 , to probability 1 at s = n and t = 1. The cutoﬀ point, (s
e, te), is
such that for all information (s, t) to the right of it, J takes n, whereas for all information
(s, t) to its left, J takes y. Figure 1 describes then an example of a cutoﬀ point strategy for
the judge, with se = n.
 
t=.5 t=1t=1 te
s=y s=n 
d=y d=n 
Figure 1: a cutoﬀ point strategy with se = n
When no appeals are allowed, then se = n as in the above figure, and te = q. What if
appeals are allowed, as the model assumes? In this case, the judge is still interested in taking
a decision d which she perceives as accurate, i.e., a decision with a higher Pr(w = d|q, s, t).
26The eﬃcient judge does not therefore simply cares for taking the right decision, but understands the
structure of the judicial system and the appeals process.
27When s = n and t = q, Pr(w = y|q, s, t) = Pr(w = y|q, s, t), since the judge’s private information exactly
oﬀsets the prior.
28The index e for (se, te) represents eﬃciency .
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But she is also forward looking and has to weigh the costs and benefits of an appeal. If an
appeal occurs, the eﬃcient judge knows that the final decision, taken by the higher court,
is correct for sure. This induces her to take the decision which is appealed more often,
meaning, the decision that is considered less accurate by the litigants. But appeals are
costly, and the decision that is more often appealed also wastes more resources. The next
lemma shows that despite this additional complexity, the behavior of the eﬃcient judge can
still be described by a cutoﬀ point strategy:
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the eﬃcient judge uses a cutoﬀ point strategy (se, te); she
takes d = y whenever Pr(w = y|q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y|q, se, te) and otherwise she takes n.
Proof: Suppose that the judge rules d. Her expected utility can be expressed by:
Pr(w = d|q, s, t) + Pr(w = d0|q, s, t)(1− qd)− θ(1− qd)2
The first expression represents the probability that her decision is correct, and hence the
final decision would be correct whether there is an appeal or not. The second expression
represents the probability that her decision is wrong but corrected by the higher court, i.e.,
an appeal is brought. The last expression represents the costs of the decision, i.e., the costs
of appeal multiplied by its probability.
Thus, whenever the judge is indiﬀerent between taking y or taking n, the above expression
has to be equal for n and for y. Equating them and re-arranging, I get the following
condition:
Pr(w = y|q, s, t)
Pr(w = n|q, s, t) =
qy − θ((1− qn)2 − (1− qy)2)
qn + θ((1− qn)2 − (1− qy)2)
(2)
When the judge takes her decision, she takes as given the beliefs of the litigants, qy and
qn. The right-hand-side of (2) does not depend therefore on (s, t) but on the beliefs of the
litigants, who have no knowledge of (s, t). The judge perceives it as constant for all (s, t).
On the other hand, by Bayesian updating:
Pr(w = y|q, s, t)
Pr(w = n|q, s, t) =



tq
(1−t)(1−q) for s = y
q(1−t)
t(1−q) for s = n


 (3)
Hence, any diﬀerent (s, t) yields a diﬀerent value of Pr(w=y|q,s,t)Pr(w=n|q,s,t) . This implies that there is
(at most) a unique (se, te) that satisfies equation (2). Thus, there is a unique cutoﬀ point
(se, te), such that the judge takes y if and only if Pr(w = y|q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = n|q, se, te).¥
Equilibrium means that (2) is satisfied, subject to 0 ≤ qd ≤ 1 for qd(δ) = qd(se, te), i.e.,
correct beliefs of the litigants. The first Proposition characterizes the equilibrium in part
(i), and presents comparative statics analysis in part (ii):
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Proposition 1 (i) When J maximizes social welfare, there is a unique informative
equilibrium, in which se = n. That is, J takes d=y when s=y or when s=n and t<te(q, θ).
(ii) The cutoﬀ point te(q, θ) increases in q and in θ, te(q, θ)q→ 1
2
→ 12 , te(q, θ)q→1 → 1,
te(q, θ)θ→0 < q and te(q, θ)θ→∞ → t˜(q) where t˜(q) is a cutoﬀ point that induces an equal
probability of appeal for both decisions. For all parameters, an appeal is more likely when
the judge contradicts previous decisions .
To understand the intuition for the equilibrium behavior of the eﬃcient judge, consider
again the solution to the judge’s problem when no appeals are allowed, i.e., se = n and
te = q. Recall that at t = q, the judge believes that each decision is equally correct. If the
judge were to use this cutoﬀ point when appeals are allowed, then, as the appendix shows,
qy > qn; the litigants believe that a decision that follows previous ones is more likely to
be correct. This implies that contradicting previous decisions is more expansive (appealed
more often), but it is also more likely to be corrected by the higher court. Given that, a
judge with t = q would rather contradict previous decisions when θ is low enough. This
increases the likelihood that the final decision is correct, since it is often challenged, and
she does not care much about the cost. If a judge with t = q preferes d = n, the cutoﬀ point
has to satisfy te < q. On the other hand, if costs are important, such a judge opts for the
cheaper decision, i.e., takes d = y. In this case, te > q. The cutoﬀ point increases therefore
with θ, which implies that the judge follows previous decisions more often. Finally, when
θ →∞, the judge cares only about costs and hence the cutoﬀ point must be such that both
decisions are challenged with the same probability.
3.2 A careerist judge
We are now ready to analyze the behavior of a careerist judge.29 Recall that the careerist
judge would like to impress an evaluator, who assesses the likelihood that she has accurate
information. In particular, she is interested in maximizing the posterior beliefs τ of the
evaluator, on her expected ability. Let τ(d,w, δ) denote the updated belief of E about the
expected type t of the judge, if E believes that J uses some strategy δ, the judge’s decision
is d and E were to know the state of the world w. That is, τ(y, y, δ) denotes the beliefs of
E when J takes y and she is correct. Similarly, τ(y, n, δ) denotes the updated belief of E
when d = y but E were to know that w = n. And so on.
The evaluator, however, does not observe the state of the world but has to form beliefs
about it. Similarly to the litigants, the evaluator knows the decision d, the prior q, and
29Note that from the point of view of L and H, the exact motivation of the judge is not important. L just
conjectures the strategy of the judge, whereas H simply reverses or aﬃrms the decision given his information
about the state of the world.
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has a conjecture about the strategy of the judge δ. Thus, when no appeal is brought, the
evaluator forms the beliefs qd(δ) that the judge is correct. On the other hand, if an appeal is
brought, the evaluator can also extract information about w from the decision of the higher
court.
The evaluator will therefore attribute the reputation τ(d, d, δ) to the judge with the
probability with which he thinks that d = w, i.e., that the decision and the state of the
world are the same. Figure 2 helps to realize when this is indeed the case. The tree in
the figure describes the possible ‘events’ in the game (whether there is an appeal or not,
whether the judge is perceived to be correct or not) and identifies the probabilities of each
of these events, as perceived by the judge herself :
A decision d
An appeal:
1-qd
No appeal:
qd
Correct:
Pr(w=d|q,s,t)
Wrong:
1-Pr(w=d|q,s,t)
Correct:
qd
Wrong:
1-qd
τ(d,d,δ)
τ(d,d’,δ)
τ(d,d,δ)
τ(d,d’,δ)
Figure 2: the probabilities with which the judge can receive the reputations τ(d, d, δ) for
being correct and τ(d, d0, δ) for being wrong, given a decision d.
For example, the judge believes that she receives the reputation τ(d, d, δ) if an appeal is
brought and she is found correct, which happens with probability (1− qd) Pr(w = d|q, s, t),
or if no appeal is brought, but the evaluator believes that she is correct, which happens
with probability q2d. We can therefore see how each of the judge’s decisions, through the
appeal process, induces a diﬀerent probability distribution over the information about the
state of the world that is available to the evaluator. This is why monitoring in this model
is endogenous, i.e., the judge can control the evaluator’s information about the state of the
world and consequently about her type.30
30The judge controls the mean and the higher moments of the distribution over signals about the state
of the world that E receives. This feature does not exist in principal-agent models for example, where the
agent controls the mean but not the variance of the signals that the principal receives.
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Using figure 2 we can express the expected utility of J from a decision d as follows:
((1−qd) Pr(w = d|q, s, t)+q2d)τ(d, d, δ)+((1−qd) Pr(w = d0|q, s, t)+qd(1−qd))τ(d, d0, δ) (4)
As seen in (4), the belief of J that she would be perceived correct by E is increasing in
Pr(w = d|q, s, t). Thus, J believes that her own information is correlated with that of E.
The greater the probability she attaches to the event that w = d, the greater the probability
she attaches to the event that E knows that w = d. This feature would discipline the judge
to behave informatively, even if E does not know w for sure and moreover, his monitoring
possibilities depend on the judge’s decision. We can then establish:
Lemma 2 In an informative equilibrium the careerist judge uses a cutoﬀ point strategy
(sc, tc), that is she takes y if and only if Pr(w = y|q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y|q, sc, tc).31
The strategy of the careerist judge is similar to that of the eﬃcient judge, who also uses
a cutoﬀ strategy. We therefore have to check what cutoﬀ point the reputation incentives
of the careerist judge induce her to choose. As a first step, we can impose more structure
on the beliefs of the evaluator E whenever he conjectures that J uses some cutoﬀ point
strategy δc = (sc, tc) and if he were to know w:
Lemma 3 (i) For any action d, π(d, d, δc) > π(d, d0, δc), (ii) If sc = n, then π(n, n, δc) >
π(y, y, δc) and π(n, y, δc) > π(y, n, δc), (iii) If sc = y, then π(y, y, δc) > π(n, n, δc) and
π(y, n, δc) > π(n, y, δc).
The Lemma follows from Bayesian updating. The first part asserts that the reputation
of J is higher if she takes the correct decision; this can arise as a signal on ability since J
is more likely to receive the correct signal when she is able, and her cut-oﬀ point strategy
is responsive to her signal. In addition, the lemma asserts the following; if sc = n, the
reputation that E attributes to those who take n, whether they succeed or fail in taking
the right decision, is higher than the reputation they receive when they take y. Intuitively,
when sc = n, J takes n only if t > tc (as in Figure 1, which describes an eﬃcient judge).
Hence, E knows that if d = n, it must be that t > tc, whereas if d = y, J may admit a
lower type, of t < tc. The opposite happens when sc = y. In this case, higher reputation is
attributed to those who take y.
The next lemma helps us to focus our analysis:
Lemma 4 In equilibrium, sc = n.
If the evaluator believes that sc = y, higher reputation is attributed to those who follow
previous decisions, by Lemma 3. Moreover, types with s = y, are more likely to be perceived
31The superscript c denotes a careerist judge.
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as taking the right decision when they follow others. But since taking the right decision also
provides a higher reputation, the expected utility from taking y is higher for these types.
Hence no such type with s = y can be indiﬀerent and the belief of the evaluator that sc = y
cannot be sustained.
Given that sc = n in equilibrium, we can now find tc. At the cutoﬀ point tc, the expected
utility from each decision, as expressed in equation (4), has to be equal. This condition,
along with correct conjectures of J 0s strategy by E and L and rational updating on their
behalf, yield the next result; the first part of the Proposition characterizes the equilibrium
whereas the second part provides comparative statics results:
Proposition 2 (i) When J is careerist, there exists a unique informative equilibrium.
In the equilibrium, the judge takes d = y if s = y or if s = n and t < tc(q). (ii) The cutoﬀ
point tc(q) increases with q, tc(q)q→ 1
2
→ 12 and tc(q)q→1 → tˆ < 1, that is, tc(q) is bounded
away from 1 for all q. In equilibrium, an appeal is more likely when the judge contradicts
previous decisions.
Two types of signals emerge in equilibrium. The first signal is proving ability by
contradicting previous decisions. This occurs because sc = n and hence, by Lemma 3,
τ(n, n, δc) > τ(y,y, δc) and τ(n, y, δc) > τ(y,n, δc). The reason is that in equilibrium only
those types with suﬃcient ability allow themselves to contradict previous decisions. The
able judges may have private information that outweighs the informativeness of past ver-
dicts. The second signal is proving ability by taking the correct decision. A type which
takes the correct decision is more likely to be able. Thus, a judge that is reversed has a
lower reputation than a judge whose decision is re-aﬃrmed. At the equilibrium cutoﬀ point,
the trade-oﬀ between these two signals manifests itself: if this type of judge follows previous
decisions, she is more likely to be correct but forgoes the possibility of using the signal of
contradicting. If she contradicts, she receives high reputation for doing so but is more likely
to err and be reversed.
Note that an informative equilibrium exists, even with endogenous monitoring. The least
able judges are not tempted to contradict previous decisions, although this provides high
reputation, because in equilibrium such an action induces a higher probability of appeal. A
higher probability of appeal is bad news since they may get ‘caught’ by the higher court.
Hence, they would rather follow others and be perceived as correct. The less talented judges
would take the risk of taking the wrong decision only if the probability of appeal is believed
to be low enough. The more able judges, on the other hand, are encouraged to take decisions
which are likely to be appealed, since this will aﬃrm their ability. Thus, although a judge’s
decision is a signal of her type and there are no exogenous costs in her utility function for
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ruling in favor of the plaintiﬀ or in favor of the defendant, costs for making the wrong ruling
are created in equilibrium.
The Proposition also characterizes the judge’s behavior as a function of the parameter q.
When q increases, the benefit from following previous decisions, everything else being equal,
is higher. This is because the terms of the reputational trade-oﬀ change; when one follows
previous decisions it becomes more likely to receive the (higher) reputation for taking the
correct decision. Hence, more types are inclined to follow previous decisions, that is, the
cutoﬀ point tc increases.
However, a significant portion of types always contradict previous decisions, since the
value of tc(q) is bounded. In particular, I find that tc is bounded by 0.625.32 Thus, when q →
1, all types in (0.625, 1) take the wrong decision, consciously and probably ineﬃciently.33
To see why tc is bounded, note that if the evaluator conjectures that tc is very high, for
example tc → 1, then π(n, ·, δc) > π(y, ·, δc). That is, the reputation from contradicting
is higher than that from following regardless of the state of the world, since those who
contradict previous decisions are only the most able types, with t → 1. In particular,
π(n, y, δc) > π(y, y, δc), i.e., even if the judge goes against her predecessors and is found
wrong, her reputation is higher compared to the scenario in which she follows them and
is found correct. Thus, if these are the beliefs of the evaluator, any judge would rather
contradict previous decisions. This implies that such beliefs for the evaluator cannot be
sustained, for any q. Consequently, there is an upper bound on the cutoﬀ point. This
feature will allow us to analyze the distortion due to career concerns, which we do next.
3.3 The main result: the distortion due to career concerns
Both the eﬃcient and the careerist judge behave in a relatively similar manner. That is,
they both contradict previous decisions only if s = n and t is high enough, in particular for
t > {te(q, θ), tc(q)} for the eﬃcient and the careerist judge respectively.34 I now compare
the behavior of the two diﬀerently motivated judge. If in equilibrium, tc(q) = te(q, θ), then
it implies that the careerist judge behaves eﬃciently. If tc(q) > te(q, θ), it means that the
careerist judge takes y more than the eﬃcient judge, which I term by excessively following
previous decisions. If, on the other hand, the equilibrium value admits tc(q) < te(q, θ), the
careerist judge takes n more than the eﬃcient judge, which I term by excessively contra-
dicting previous decisions. The next result establishes that the judge tends to excessively
32This number is computed for the uniform prior distribution of the judge’s types. The model is general
and can be extended to other distributions. In this case, the upper bound would be diﬀerent.
33 I discuss the ineﬃciency of the careerist judge’s decisions in the next section.
34Moreover, a judge who cares both for eﬃciency and reputation would use a cutoﬀ point which is in
between the respective cutoﬀs for each type of judge, the eﬃcient and the careerist one.
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contradict previous decisions.
Proposition 3 For any q, there exists θ(q), such that for all θ ≥ θ(q), the careerist
judge excessively contradicts previous decisions, that is, tc(q) < te(q, θ). Moreover, there
exists q¯, such that for all q≥q¯, θ(q) = 0.
Figure 3 describes the behavior of both judges in equilibrium. Recall that the figure
depicts the information of the judge so that as we go from left to right, Pr(w = n|s, t)
increases. The figure shows the area (tc, te) in which the eﬃcient judge takes d = y whereas
the careerist judge takes d = n:
 
t=.5 t=1t=1 te
s=y s=n 
d=y d=n 
tc
Figure 3: A comparison between the careerist and the eﬃcient judge
The conclusion is that previous decisions, or non-binding precedent, tend to have less
eﬀect when the judge has reputation concerns, resulting in an underutilization of readily
available information. The intuition is that the careerist judge gains excessive reputation
from contradicting previous decisions whereas the eﬃcient judge treats each of these de-
cisions symmetrically. Both judges have induced incentives to take the right decision; the
eﬃcient one since she cares about it directly, and the careerist one since she cares about
it indirectly, because it provides higher reputation. However, the careerist judge has an
additional incentive to contradict previous decisions, since it too provides high reputation
in equilibrium.
The result is derived for high enough values of q, or, for high enough values of θ. For high
values of q, the intuition is that the eﬃcient judge has to follow previous decisions quite often
since it is more likely to be the correct decision. On the other hand, the cutoﬀ point of the
careerist judge is bounded for any q by some tˆ, as established in the previous section. Thus,
no matter how high q is, a significant portion of types has to contradict previous decisions.
For high values of θ, similarly, the eﬃcient judge is inclined to follow previous decisions,
since this is the cheaper course of action. The litigants view it as the more accurate decision
and as a result challenge it less often. The judge who wishes to save on costs in this case,
follows others. For the careerist judge, this consideration is irrelevant. Note that indeed
it is reasonable in the context of our model that θ is high enough. Otherwise, if θ is low,
deliberation is not costly, and the judicial system should enforce appeals, or target almost
all cases to the higher court.35
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Remark 2 The results reported in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 yield the following
empirical predictions. First, a judge who contradicts previous decisions and is aﬃrmed, is
the most likely to be promoted. A judge who follows previous decisions and is reversed,
is the least likely to be promoted. Second, a careerist judge tends to contradict previous
decisions more than an eﬃcient judge. Thus, if incentives can be identified, stronger career
concerns imply that when a judge contradicts previous decisions, she is more likely to be
challenged by litigants, and also more likely to be reversed.
In other contexts, several papers analyzed the behavior of careerist experts and showed
that experts may behave ineﬃciently by excessively contradicting prior information.36 All
the papers in this literature assume exogenous monitoring, i.e., that the evaluator knows
what is the right decision independently of the decision itself. The contribution of the
suggested judicial model to this literature is therefore the analysis of endogenous monitoring.
It remains to be seen how do endogenous and exogenous monitoring compare, a task we
tackle next.
4 Institutional design
It is widely recognized that institutions matter; that is, the design of the judicial system
aﬀects the behavior of the judge through the incentives it creates. In this section I analyze
the eﬀect of diﬀerent judicial systems on the behavior of a careerist judge and in particular,
I analyze which institutions can increase social utility.
Social utility is defined in the model as the probability that the correct decision is taken,
at the minimum costs. The indirect social utility is a function of the careerist judge’s
behavior, summarized by the cutoﬀ point tc(q); the equilibrium behavior of the judge and
the litigants determines how likely it is that the final decision is correct and how costly is
each decision. The next lemma proves useful for the design analysis:
Lemma 5 When the judge is careerist, then for high enough values of θ, social utility
increases when tc(q) increases.
The Lemma asserts that indeed, since the judge contradicts previous decisions excessively
compared to the eﬃcient judge, social utility is best served when this behavior is mitigated.
We can therefore focus on these range of parameters, i.e., high enough θ, and look for
instruments that increase the tendency of the judge to follow previous decisions. That is,
35Numerical analysis shows that the judge contradicts previous decisions excessively for all other parame-
ters as well, but I cannot prove it analytically.
36See for example Levy (2003), Trueman (1994) and Avery and Chevalier (1999). Eﬃciency, in these
papers, usually means taking the right decision. In the judicial decision making context however, as analyzed
in this paper, eﬃciency is more involved since the judge is not the final decision maker.
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for methods that increase tc(q).37
4.1 Who should nominate judges?
The procedure of judges’ nomination is heavily debated in many countries. The debate
centers on whether judges should be appointed (for example by the legal community) or
elected (by the public). These diﬀerent methods are considered to have bearing on how
independent judges’ decisions are. In this paper I consider the eﬀect of diﬀerent nomination
systems on the reputation concerns and as a result on the eﬃciency of judicial decisions.38
The model presented in the previous sections analyzes the case of endogenous monitoring.
That is, it assumes that the evaluator, who is concerned about whether to promote judges
or not, can only glean information about the correct interpretation of the law from decisions
of the high court. Thus, the evaluator can be taken to represent the public or a group of
politicians, who do not have independent information about the right decision.
On the other hand, Supreme Court Justices or lawyers may know the correct interpreta-
tion of the law (i.e., the state of the world) even if they do not adjudicate the case. Thus,
when Supreme Court Justices review the judge’s file and decide whether to promote her or
not, they can determine whether she was right or wrong in each case without the need to
wait for an appeal. This can be represented by a model with exogenous monitoring, i.e., a
model in which the evaluator knows w independently of the judicial process.
I now compare the equilibrium of the model when the judge is promoted by her supe-
riors, i.e., the evaluator knows the state w independently of the judicial process, and the
equilibrium when she is elected by the public, i.e., the evaluator knows the state w only if
an appeal is brought (this equilibrium is characterized in Proposition 2). Intuitively, the
more information the evaluator possesses, the harder it is for less able judges to mimic the
more able judges. The next result however characterizes the equilibrium when the evaluator
knows w and shows that it is actually less eﬃcient.
Proposition 4 (i) When E knows w, the careerist judge takes y when s=y or when s=n
37The reason that we need Lemma 5, is that the litigants behave ineﬃciently in the model, that is, not
according to the social preferences. Thus, given this additional distortion, we cannot use the comparison
between the eﬃcient judge and the careerist judge to directly deduce that social utility increases when the
careerist judge behaves ‘more like’ the eﬃcient judge. However, Lemma 5 establishes that this can indeed
be the case.
38Landes and Posner (2000) show that two diﬀerent reputation systems are indeed created for judges.
Citation by other judges is considered as a measure of reputation attributed by the legal community, whereas
search for judges on the web can approximate fame or popular reputation attributed by the public. These
diﬀerent measures create a diﬀerent list of ‘top’ judges.
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and t<tf (q).39 (ii) The careerist judge follows previous decisions more often when E learns
information from appeals than when E has full information, i.e., tf (q) < tc(q). Social utility
is therefore higher when the evaluator learns information only from appeals.
Increasing the amount of information available to the evaluator is even worse; it further
distorts the decisions of the judge. The implication of the Proposition is that judges should
be elected by the public and not by the more knowledgeable legal community.
What is the intuition for this counter-intuitive finding? When the evaluator learns from
appeals, an important feature of the equilibrium is that the probability of appeal is lower
after a decision that follows previous ones. Following others becomes a ‘safe action’ in
equilibrium; less information about the judge’s type is revealed. Contradicting previous
decisions, on the other hand, induces a higher probability of appeal in equilibrium and
it is therefore a ‘risky’ action for the less able types, who are likely to be reviewed and
found wrong. These types indeed prefer to hide the truth about their ability and hence
their incentive to mimic able judges by contradicting previous decision is mitigated. This
cannot happen with exogenous monitoring, where the evaluator knows the state of the world
irrespective of the state and the judge’s decision.40
The implication that judges should be nominated by the public should be taken with
caution; when considering eﬃciency, I have concentrated on the social utility from present
decisions. I have therefore ignored considerations such as electing the more able judges. If
the public elects judges, the judge behaves more eﬃciently at present. But it is not clear if
indeed the public elects the better judges, so as to increase the eﬃciency of future decisions.
This intertemporal trade-oﬀ awaits future research.
Remark 3 The result of Proposition 4 implies the following empirical predictions. First,
conditional on an appeal, a judge appointed by superior judges is more likely to be reversed
when she contradicts previous decisions compared to a judge elected by the public. The
opposite holds when the judge follows previous decisions. Second, a judge appointed by
superior judges is more likely to be challenged by litigants when she contradicts previous
decisions, compared to a judge elected by the public.
39The superscript f denotes that the evaluator has full information.
40 In his seminal paper about career concerns, Holmström (1982) assumes the existence of a ‘safe action’.
In his framework, a manager could decide between two actions, invest or not. Investment is risky, in the
sense that the state of the world is revealed if it is taken. Not investing is safe, in the sense that the state
of the world is not revealed. Here, I derive a ‘safe action’ and a ‘risky action’ endogenously.
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4.2 Binding precedent
The intuition gained from the pervious analysis is that the judge behaves more eﬃciently if
contradiction of previous decisions is penalized by a higher risk of appeal. This is because it
reduces the distortive signaling incentives of the less able judges. If the higher court could
commit to a higher rate of reversal when the judge contradicts her predecessors, litigants
could indeed be encouraged to bring an appeal more often.
This suggestion, of diﬀerent legal standards, seems to be in accord with stare decisis, the
praxis of the Common Law legal system. The concept of binding precedent implies that
appeals courts are more likely to reverse a decision that contradicts precedent than one
that follows precedent. Accordingly, I model binding precedent in the following way; when
the judge follows or contradicts previous decisions and is found wrong, the higher court
reverses her decision as before. But, even when the judge contradicts previous decisions
and is correct, the higher court can commit to overturn this decision with some probability.
Thus, implicitly, this modelling implies that higher courts act in order to preserve the
strength of previous decisions; a contrarian lower-court judge should be reversed even if she
is correct.
If the higher court could use such a strategy, it would indeed increase the incentives of
litigants to appeal when a judge contradicts previous decisions, as desired. It is not clear
how the higher court can commit to implement such a strategy, which induces it to take
a decision which it perceives as wrong. For now, I depart from these considerations, and
discuss them later on.
Formally, suppose that we can optimally choose the strategy of the higher court and let
φ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which the judge is overruled when d = n and w = n.
When d = n and w = y she is reversed with probability 1. No changes are made when
d = y, that is, the decision is aﬃrmed if and only if w = y. Litigants appeal with a higher
probability when d = n, because the probability of reversal is now 1−qn+qnφ. The exercise
is therefore to find what is the optimal φ, that is, a value of φ that maximizes social utility:
Proposition 5 When precedents bind, the judge contradicts precedent more often, that
is, tc(q) is lower for any φ > 0 relative to the case in which φ = 0. Thus, φ = 0 maximizes
social welfare.
Surprisingly, binding precedent do not induce the judge to behave more eﬃciently, and
even have the contrary eﬀect. The intuition for this result is as follows. When previous
decisions bind, if the judge takes n, she may be perceived as being correct even if she is
subsequently reversed: the evaluator knows that the higher court also reverses correct deci-
sions. Hence, judges of low ability are induced to take n and contradict previous decisions,
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because the loss from being reversed is now lower. Instead of following more often, they
do the opposite. This implies, given Lemma 5, that social utility decreases when precedent
bind.
Given the ineﬃciency of the praxis of binding precedent as modelled above, we should
not worry about the higher court implementing such a strategy; in other words, even if
the higher court could commit to behave in the manner described above, social eﬃciency
considerations would induce it not to use such a praxis.41
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I show that judges with career concerns contradict previous decisions more
than is eﬃcient. By doing so, they pretend to have a more accurate information than the
one supplied by previous judges. Thus, if judges are motivated by proving how able they
are in interpreting the law we should observe higher rates of reversal when they contradict
previous decisions, compared to judges who are motivated by eﬃciency and social welfare.
The model analyzes a one-shot game, i.e., the adjudication of one case. The main results
should hold also in a dynamic context, in which the judge adjudicates a sequence of cases.
When the game is prolonged, more information is revealed about the judge after each of
her decisions. This only induces a diﬀerent prior belief about the judge’s type after each
stage, and hence the results should be robust to this extension.
Finally, there are many ways to think of reputation motives. In this paper I have used
ability as a desired trait for a judge. It is also probable that the judge is trying to prove
to her evaluators, be it the public, politicians or higher-court judges, that she shares their
preferences regarding the interpretation of the law. The model presented here could be
accommodated to explore the implication of such reputation motive.42
Appendix
The next lemma is useful for the rest of the analysis:
Lemma 6 When J uses a cutoﬀ point strategy (s∗, t∗), then:
(i) qn(n, t
∗) increases with t∗ and qn(y, t∗) decreases with t∗;
(ii) qy(n, t
∗) decreases with t∗ and qy(y, t∗) increases with t∗;
(iii) qn(n, t
∗) > qn(y, t∗) and qy(n, t∗) < qy(y, t∗);
(iv) qy(s
∗, t∗) > q and qn(s∗, t∗) > 1− q;
41There may be other motivations to use stare decisis, such as uniformity and predictability.
42The need of experts to accumulate reputation for having the same preferences as their principal is
analyzed in Morris (2001).
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(v) qy(s
∗, t∗) > Pr(w = y|q, s∗, t∗) and qn(s∗, t∗) > Pr(w = n|q, s∗, t∗);
(vi) ∃!(s˜, t˜(q)) such that qy(s˜, t˜(q)) = qn(s˜, t˜(q)), where s˜ = n and t˜(q) > q.
For the proof, note that when J uses a cutoﬀ point strategy, δ∗ = (s∗, t∗), we can write qd(s∗, t∗) in
the following way, according to the definition in the text:
qy(n, t
∗) =
q(
R 1
.5 vf(v)dv +
R t∗
.5 (1− v)f(v)dv)
q(
R 1
.5 vf(v)dv +
R t∗
.5 (1− v)f(v)dv) + (1− q)(
R 1
.5(1− v)f(v)dv +
R t∗
.5 vf(v)dv)
qn(n, t
∗) =
(1− q)
R 1
t∗ vf(v)dv
(1− q)
R 1
t∗ vf(v)dv + q
R 1
t∗(1− v)f(v)dv
.
where f(v) is the prior distribution over t. Similar expressions hold when s∗ = y.
Proof of Lemma 6:
(i) qn(n, t
∗) increases with t∗ :
sign
∂
∂t∗ qn(n, t
∗) = sign(1− q)qf(t∗)[−t∗
Z 1
t∗
(1− v)f(v)dv + (1− t∗)
Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv]
= sign− t∗
Z 1
t∗
f(v)dv + t∗
Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv +
Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv − t∗
Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv
= sign(1− q)qf(t∗)[−t∗
Z 1
t∗
f(v)dv +
Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv] > 0
Similarly, I will show that qn(y, t
∗) decreases with t∗ :
sign
∂
∂t∗ qn(s
∗= y, t∗)
= sign(1− t∗)(
Z 1
.5
(1− v)f(v)dv +
Z t∗
.5
vf(v)dv)− t∗(
Z 1
.5
vf(v)dv +
Z t∗
.5
(1− v)f(v)dv)
= sign(1− q)qf(t∗)(
Z t∗
.5
(1− 2t∗)f(v)dv +
Z 1
t∗
(1− t∗ − v)f(v)dv) < 0.¤
(ii) The proof of this is analogous to part (i).¤
(iii) Follows from (i) and (ii).¤
(iv) By the above claims, it is enough to show that qy(n, t
∗) > q, i.e., that:
q(
R 1
.5 vf(v)dv +
R t∗
.5 (1− v)f(v)dv)
q(
R 1
.5 vf(v)dv +
R t∗
.5 (1− v)f(v)dv) + (1− q)(
R 1
.5(1− v)f(v)dv +
R t∗
.5 vf(v)dv)
> q
which holds ifZ 1
.5
vf(v)dv +
Z t∗
.5
(1− v)f(v)dv >
Z 1
.5
(1− v)f(v)dv +
Z t∗
.5
vf(v)dv ⇐⇒Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv >
Z 1
t∗
(1− v)f(v)dv ⇐⇒
Z 1
t∗
(2v − 1)f(v)dv > 0.
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The second part, i.e., that qn(s
∗, t∗) > 1− q, has an analogous proof.¤
(v) To show that qy(n, t
∗) > Pr(w = y|q, n, t∗), we need to show that:
qy(n, t
∗) >
q(1− t∗)
q(1− t∗) + t∗(1− q)
which, after re-arranging, is analogous to:
t∗(
Z 1
.5
vf(v)dv +
Z t∗
.5
(1− v)f(v)dv) > (1− t∗)(
Z 1
.5
(1− v)f(v)dv +
Z t∗
.5
vf(v)dv)
where the last inequality is satisfied using the proof in step (iv). To show that qy(y, t
∗) > Pr(w =
y|q, y, t∗), we need to show that:
qy(y, t
∗)>
qt∗
qt∗ + (1− t∗)(1− q) ⇐⇒R 1
t∗ vf(v)dvR 1
t∗(1− v)f(v)dv
>
t∗
1− t∗ ,
but Z 1
t∗
vf(v)dv > t∗ and
Z 1
t∗
(1− v)f(v)dv < 1− t∗,
hence the above is satisfied. We can use the analogous proof to show that qn(s
∗, t∗) > Pr(w =
n|q, s∗, t∗).¤
(vi) Note that qy(y,
1
2) > qn(y,
1
2), and by the above claims this holds for all t
∗ > 12 and s
∗ = y.
On the other hand, qy(n, t
∗ → 1) → q and qn(n, t∗ → 1) → 1. Since qn(n, t∗) increases with t∗
and qy(n, t
∗) decreases with t∗, there exists a unique t˜(q) such that qy(n, t˜(q)) = qn(n, t˜(q)) and
for all t∗ < (>)t˜(q), qy(n, t∗) > (<)qn(n, t∗). With the uniform distribution, i.e., f(v) = 2, then
qy(n, q) =
2−q
3−2q ≥
1+q
1+2q = qn(n, q) for all q ≥ .5 which implies that t˜(q) > q.¤
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.¥
Proof of Proposition 1. An equilibrium is a solution to equation (2) in the text given true beliefs
of L about the strategy of J. Thus, it is a solution to the fixed point equation in se, te :
Pr(w = y|q, se, te)
Pr(w = n|q, se, te) =
qy(s
e, te)− θβ(se, te)
qn(se, te) + θβ(se, te)
(5)
where β(se, te) = (1− qn(se, te))2 − (1− qy(se, te))2.
Step 1. Existence and characterization.
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When se = y,
Pr(w = y|q, y, te)
Pr(w = n|q, y, te) >
qy(y, t
e)
qn(y, te)
>
qy(y, t
e)− θβ(y, te)
qn(y, te) + θβ(y, te)
The second inequality follows because qy(y, t
e) > qn(y, t
e). The first inequality holds for all t iﬀ:
qt
(1− q)(1− t) >
q(1+t)
q(1+t)+(1−t)(1−q)
(1−q)(2−t)
(1−q)(2−t)+qt
which is satisfied for all t > 12 and q >
1
2 . On the other hand, when s
e = n and te = t˜(q) > q,
Pr(w = y|q, n, t˜(q))
Pr(w = n|q, n, t˜(q)) < 1 =
qy(n, t˜(q))− θβ(n, t˜(q)))
qnn, t˜(q)) + θβ(n, t˜(q)))
.
Hence, there exists se = n and te ∈ (.5, t˜(q)) that supports an equilibrium.
Step 2. Uniqueness:
I will show that at the equilibrium value of te, whenever ∂
∂t
qy(n,t)−θβ(n,t)
qn(n,t)+θβ(n,t)
< 0, then:
| ∂∂t
Pr(w = y|q, n, t)
Pr(w = n|q, n, t) | > |
∂
∂t
qy(n, t)− θβ(n, t)
qn(n, t) + θβ(n, t)
|
which is a suﬃcient condition for uniqueness.43
Consider first
Pr(w=y|q,n,t)
Pr(w=n|q,n,t) =
q(1−t)
t(1−q) . Then:
| ∂∂t
Pr(w = y|q, n, t)
Pr(w = n|q, n, t) | =
q
(1− q)t2
Now consider
| ∂∂t
qy(n, t)− θ(β(n, t)
qn(n, t) + θβ(n, t)
|
=
1
qn + θβ
[
∂qy
∂t (−1 + θ
∂β
∂qy
+ θ ∂β∂qy
qy − θβ
qn + θβ
) +
∂qn
∂t ((1 + θ
∂β
∂qn
)
qy − θβ
qn + θβ
+ θ ∂β∂qn
)]
but since
∂β
∂qy
> 0,
∂β
∂qn
< 0 ,
∂qn
∂t > 0 and
∂qy
∂t < 0,
it is enough to show that
q
(1− q)t2 >
1
qn
[−∂qy∂t +
∂qn
∂t
qy − θβ
qn + θβ
]
Plugging in the equilibrium condition and the expressions for the derivatives, the right-hand-side becomes:
1
qn
[
2qy(1− qy)
(2− t)t +
q
(1 + t)
2qn(1− qn)
t(1− q) ]
Let qx ∈ {qy, qn} such that qx(1 − qx) = max{qy(1 − qy), qn(1 − qn)}. It is therefore suﬃcient to
43Note that ∂∂t
p(w=y|n,t)
p(w=n|n,t) < 0, and that if
∂
∂t
qy(n,t)−θδ(qy(n,t),qn(n,t))
qn(n,t)+θδ(qy(n,t),qn(n,t)) > 0, uniqueness is assured.
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prove that:
q
t
>
2qx(1− qx)
qn
[
(1 + t)(1− q) + q(2− t)
(2− t)(1 + t) ]
But the above equation holds both when qx = qn and when qx = qy.
I will now prove part (ii) of the Proposition. Since the equilibrium is unique, and for all θ there exists an
equilibrium with te < t˜(q), for t˜(q) that satisfies qy(s, t˜(q)) = qn(s, t˜(q)), then in equilibrium, qy > qn,
which implies that the probability of appeal is higher when d = n. Moreover, Pr(w=y|q,n,t
e)
Pr(w=n|q,n,te) is constant
for all θ whereas qy(n,t
e)−θβ(n,te)
qn(n,te)+θβ(n,te)
decreases with θ whenever β > 0, i.e., for all te(q, θ) < t˜(q), which
along with uniqueness implies that te increases with θ.When θ = 0, then the left-hand-side of (5) equals 1
when t = q, whereas the right-hand-side is greater than 1, by part (vi) of Lemma 6. Hence, te(q, 0) < q.
Finally, when θ → ∞, only costs matter. The judge can be indiﬀerent between the two decisions only if
the probability of appeal is equal for both, i.e., if qy(n, t
e) = qn(n, t
e)→ te(q, θ)→ t˜(q).
By total diﬀerentiation of the equilibrium condition:
dt
dq
|t=te =
∂
∂q
qy(n,t)−θβ(n,t)
qn(n,t)+θβ(n,t)
− ∂
∂q
Pr(w=y|q,n,t)
Pr(w=n|q,n,t)
∂
∂t
Pr(w=y|q,n,t)
Pr(w=n|q,n,t) −
∂
∂t
qy(n,t)−θβ(n,t)
qn(n,t)+θβ(n,t)
|t=te
I will show that when
Pr(w=y|q,n,t)
Pr(w=n|q,n,t) =
qy(n,t)−θβ(n,t)
qn(n,t)+θβ(n,t)
,
∂
∂q
Pr(w = y|q, n, t)
Pr(w = n|q, n, t) >
∂
∂q
qy(n, t)− θ(n, t)
qn(n, t) + θ(n, t)
which, along with step 2, implies that dtdq |t=te > 0. As in step 2, it is enough to show the inequality for
θ = 0, i.e., we have to show that:
(1− t)
t(1− q)2 >
1
qn
[
∂qy
∂q −
∂qn
∂q
q(1− t)
t(1− q) ]⇐⇒
(1− t)
t(1− q)2 >
1
qn
[
qy(1− qy)
q(1− q) +
qn(1− qn)(1− t)
t(1− q)2 ]
but since qy > qn in equilibrium, and for all q and t, qy > 1− qn, it is suﬃcient to show that:
(1− t)
t(1− q)2 >
qn(1− qn)
qn
[
1
q(1− q) +
(1− t)
t(1− q)2 ]⇐⇒
q(1− t)
t(1− q) + q(1− t) >
q(1− t)
(1− q)(1 + t) + q(1− t)
which holds for all t, q ∈ [.5, 1]. This implies that dtdq |t=te > 0. To see that te(q, θ)q→ 12 →
1
2 and
te(q, θ)q→1 → 1 we just need to consider (5) and the result arises.
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This completes the proof of Proposition 1.¥
Proof of Lemma 2. In an informative equilibrium, some types of J take n whereas some types
take y. This implies that there must be at least one type (s, t) who is indiﬀerent between taking n and y.
That is, the following condition must hold for some (s, t) :
p˜(y)τ(y, y, δ) + (1− p˜(y))τ(y, n, δ) = p˜(n)τ(n, n, δ) + (1− p˜(n))τ(n, y, δ) (6)
where
p˜(d) = (1− qd) Pr(w = d|q, s, t) + q2d (7)
re-arranging (6), and plugging the expressions for p˜(n) and p˜(y) from (7), we get:
Pr(w=y|s,t,q)
Pr(w=n|s,t,q) =
π(n,n,δ)(q2n+1−qn)+π(n,y,δ)(qn−q2n)−π(y,y,δ)q2y−π(y,n,δ)(1−q2y)
π(y,y,δ)(q2y+1−qy)+π(y,n,δ)(qy−q2y)−π(n,n,δ)q2n−π(n,y,δ)(1−q2n)
(8)
The right-hand-side of (8) is fixed for all (s, t), since these are the beliefs of the evaluator. The evaluator
does not know (s, t) and hence cannot condition his beliefs on this information. The left-hand-side of (8),
on the other hand, changes with (s, t), as in the Proof of Lemma 1. Hence, any diﬀerent (s, t) yields a
diﬀerent value of
Pr(w=y|q,s,t)
Pr(w=n|q,s,t) . This implies that there is (at most) a unique (s
c, tc) that satisfies equation
(8). Thus, there is a unique cutoﬀ point (sc, tc), such that if Pr(w = y|q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y|q, sc, tc)
the judge takes y, and otherwise, she takes n.¥
Proof of Lemma 3. τ(d,w, δc) is an expectation over t, using an updated density function
given the observations of d and w, and the knowledge of the cutoﬀ point strategy δ, i.e., τ(d,w, δc) =R 1
.5 tf(t|d,w, δc)dt. To show thatZ 1
.5
tf(t|d, d, δc)dt >
Z 1
.5
tf(t|d, d0, δc)dt
we can use the MLRP property, i.e., show that
f(t|d, d, δc)
f(t0|d, d, δc) ≥
f(t|d, d0, δc)
f(t0|d, d0, δc)
for t ≥ t0 with a strict inequality for at least one pair of values t and t0. It is easy to see that the MLRP
is satisfied in this case, since whenever J uses a cutoﬀ strategy with sc = n, then:
f(t|y, y, δc) =



t if t > tc
1 otherwise


 , f(t|n, n, δ
c) =



t if t > tc
0 otherwise



and
f(t|y, n, δc) =



1− t if t > tc
1 otherwise


 , f(t|n, y, δ
c) =



1− t if t > tc
0 otherwise



implying that
f(t|d, d, δc)
f(t|d, d0, δc) =



t
1−t if t > t
c
1 otherwise



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for all d, which increases with t. The analogous analysis holds when sc = y.
(ii) When sc = n, τ(y, y, δc) < τ(n, n, δc) and τ(y, n, δc) < τ(n, y, δc) :
Similarly to part (i), I can show that when sc = n,Z 1
.5
tf(t|n, n, δc)dt >
Z 1
.5
tf(t|y, y, δc)dt
and that Z 1
.5
tf(t|n, y, δc)dt >
Z 1
.5
tf(t|y, n, δc)dt
by using the MLRP and in particular showing that
f(t|n,y,δc)
f(t|y,n,δc) and
f(t|n,n,δc)
f(t|y,y,δc) increase with t. Since
f(t|n, n, δc)
f(t|y, y, δc) =
f(t|n, y, δc)
f(t|y, n, δc) =



1 if t > tc
0 otherwise



the result follows. (iii) The results for sc = y follow from symmetry and part (ii).¥
Proof of Lemma 4. Given (7), the expected utility from an action d is
p˜(d)τ(d, d, δc) + (1− p˜(d))τ(d, d0, δc).
When sc = y, then τ(y, n, δc) > τ(n, y, δc) and τ(y, y, δc) > τ(n, n, δc), by Lemma 3. I will now
show that when sc = y, for any type s = y, also p˜(y) > p˜(n). This implies that the expected utility from
ruling y is greater than the expected utility from ruling n for all s = y because τ(y, y, δc) > τ(y, n, δc)
and τ(n, n, δc) > τ(n, y, δc), and hence no type with s = y can be indiﬀerent:
p˜(y)= q2y + (1− qy) Pr(w = y|q, y, t)
>qyqn + (1− qy) Pr(w = n|q, y, t)
>q2n + (1− qn) Pr(w = n|q, y, t)
= p˜(n)
The first inequality follows because qy(y, t) > qn(y, t) and Pr(w = y|q, y, t) > Pr(w = n|q, y, t).
The second inequality follows because qn > Pr(w = n|q, y, t). This completes the proof.¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
Step 1: Existence: If sc = n and tc = t˜(q), then p˜(y) < p˜(n) while τ(n, n, δc) > τ(y, y, δc) and
τ(n, y, δc) > τ(y, n, δc). This implies that the utility from ruling n is higher than the utility from ruling
y. Hence, along with Lemma 4, this assures existence.
Step 2: tc(q) < tˆ for all q : Let sc = n and t = tc. I will show that there is a unique tˆ < 1
satisfying τ tˆ(y, y, δc) = τ tˆ(n, y, δc), and that for all t > tˆ, τ(y, y, δc) < τ(n, y, δc). This implies
that an equilibrium with t > tˆ cannot exist, since then the expected utility from ruling n, an average
27
over τ(n, y, δc) and τ(n, n, δc) where τ(n, n, δc) > τ(n, y, δc), is higher than the expected utility from
ruling y, an average over τ(y, n, δc) and τ(y, y, δc) where τ(y, y, δc) > τ(y, n, δc).
The expression for τ(y, y, δc)|sc=n is
τ(y, y, δc)|sc=n =
R 1
.5 t
2f(t)dt+
R tc
.5 t(1− t)f(t)dtR 1
.5 tf(t)dt+
R tc
.5 (1− t)f(t)dt
Taking the derivative of τ(y, y, δc)|sc=n w.r.t tc, it is
dτ(y, y, δc)
dtc
|sc=n = (1− t
c)f(tc)(tc − τ(y, y, δc))
(
R 1
.5 tf(t)dt+
R tc
.5 (1− t)f(t)dt)2
Therefore, τ(y, y, δc) is a monotonically decreasing function as long as tc < τ(y, y, δc) and a monoton-
ically increasing function when tc > τ(y, y, δc). When tc → .5, tc < τ(y, y, δc) and when tc → 1,
τ(y, y, δc) < tc. Therefore, there exists t0 such that t0 = τ t0(y, y, δc). Moreover, t0 is unique, since when
tc > τ(y, y, δc), dτ(y,y,δ
c)
dtc < 1. Thus, for all t
c < (>)t0, tc < (>)τ(y, y, δc) and dτ(y,y,δ
c)
dtc < (>)0.
On the other hand, τ(n, y, δc) is an average over t for t > tc and thus increases with tc for all tc > .5.
Also, since only values of t > tc are included in the computation of τ(n, y, δc), then τ(n, y, δc) >
tc for all tc. By the above, when tc → 1, τ(n, y, δc) > tc > τ(y, y, δc). When tc = .5, by
Lemma 3, τ(y, y, δc) = τ(n, n, δc) > τ(n, y, δc). Then, there must exist some tˆ ∈ (.5, 1) satisfying
τ tˆ(y, y, δc) = τ tˆ(n, y, δc). Moreover, it must be that tˆ < t0 because for all tc > t0, τ(n, y, δc) >
tc > τ(y, y, δc). Because τ(y, y, δc) decreases monotonically for tc < tˆ and τ(n, y, δc) increases
monotonically in tc, tˆ is unique.
Step 3: Uniqueness: First, note that when sc = n, p˜(y) decreases with t whereas p˜(n) increases with
t and p˜(y) increases with q whereas p˜(n) decreases with q. To see this, recall that:
p˜(y) = q2y + (1− qy) Pr(w = y|q, s, t),
hence:
∂p˜(y)
∂t |sc=n = (2qy − Pr(w = y|q, n, t))
∂qy
∂t + (1− qy)
∂ Pr(w = y|q, n, t)
∂t
but when sc = n,
∂qy
∂t < 0. Also,
∂ Pr(w=y|q,n,t)
∂t and 2qy − Pr(w = y|q, s, t) > 0 by Lemma 6.
Similarly,
∂p˜(n)
∂t = (2qn − Pr(w = n|q, n, t))
∂qn
∂t + (1− qn)
∂ Pr(w = n|q, n, t)
∂t > 0.
An analogous analysis holds for the derivatives w.r.t. q.
Now, the proof of step 2 (ii) showed that τ(n, y, δc) is increasing in t, whereas similar analysis holds for
τ(n, n, δc). It also showed that τ(y, y, δc) is decreasing in the range [.5, tˆ], and analogous analysis holds
for τ(y, n, δc). Thus, uniqueness is assured since the expected utility from ruling n is increasing for all t,
and the expected utility from ruling y is decreasing for all t.
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Step 4: tc(q) increases with q, tc(q)q→ 1
2
→ 12 and tc(q)q→1 → tˆ : p˜(y) increases with q whereas
p˜(n) decreases with q and hence the utility from y increases for all t relative to the utility from ruling n,
which implies that in equilibrium the judge has to rule y more often, i.e., tc(q) increases. The boundary
results are trivial using the equilibrium condition specified in Lemma 2.¥
Proof of Proposition 3. When the judge is eﬃcient, he uses a cutoﬀ point te(q, θ) ∈ [.5, t˜(q)].
On the other hand, the careerist judge uses tc(q) < min{t˜(q), tˆ}. Since te(q, θ) is a continuous function
which increases with q and θ, there exists q¯ for which te(q¯, 0) = tˆ. Hence, for all q > q¯, tc(q) < te(q, θ).
For other values of q, since te(q, θ) increases with θ and converges to t˜(q) when θ →∞, and since tc(q) <
t˜(q) and does not depend on θ, there exists θ(q) such that for all θ ≥ θ(q), the result holds.¥
Proof of Lemma 5. We first have to define the expression for social utility, denoted by U(t) (for
brevity the index c from tc is omitted):
U(t) =
q(
Z 1
.5
2vdv +
Z t
.5
2(1− v)dv +
Z 1
t
2(1− v)dv(1− qn(n, t)))
+(1− q)(
Z 1
t
2vdv + (
Z 1
.5
2(1− v)dv +
Z t
.5
2vdv)(1− qy(n, t)
−θ(1− qy)2(q(
Z 1
.5
2vdv +
Z t
.5
2(1− v)dv) + (1− q)(
Z 1
.5
2(1− v)dv +
Z t
.5
2vdv))
−θ(1− qn)2(q
Z 1
t
2(1− v)dv + (1− q)(
Z 1
t
2vdv)
The first two lines express the social gain from taking the right decision. This happens when the judge takes
the correct decision, or when she does not, but an appeal is brought. The remaining expressions measure
the social loss from the costs of appeal. This are paid when an appeal is brought.
I will now show that for high enough values of θ, in particular for θ > 12 ,
∂U(t)
∂t > 0 :
∂U(t)
∂t =2q(1− t)qn − 2t(1− q)qy + θ(2t(1− q)
+2(1− t)q)((1− qn)2 − (1− qy)2)
+2(2θ − 1)[(1− q)(1− qn)2 − q(1− qy)2]
Note that when t = te, then the first two elements are 0, whereas for any t < te, the first two elements
are positive (see the proof of Proposition 1). Finally, when θ > 12 , the last element is positive since for any
t < t˜(q),
(1− q)(1− qn)2 − q(1− qy)2 > 0.
Hence, for high enough θ, ∂U(t)
∂t > 0.¥
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Proof of Proposition 4. (i) For the proof of the first part, see Proposition 1 in Levy (2003). (ii)
I will now show that tf (q) < tc(q). tf (q) solves:
Pr(w = y|q, n, tf (q))Γy = Pr(w = n|q, n, tf (q))Γn + Γ (9)
where Γy = τ(y, y, δf ) − τ(y, n, δf ), Γn = τ(n, n, δf ) − τ(n, y, δf ) and Γ = τ(n, y, δf ) −
τ(y, n, δf ). We will show that at tf (q),
p˜(y)Γy > p˜(n)Γn + Γ (10)
for p˜(d) = (1− qd) Pr(w = d|q, n, tf (q))+ q2d, which implies that at tf (q), the utility from y is higher
than the utility from n if appeals are allowed, meaning that the equilibrium solution tc(q) must admit
tc(q) > tf (q).
Plugging (9) into (10), we have to show that:
qy(qy − Pr(w= y|q, n, tf (q)))Γy > qn(qn − Pr(w = n|q, n, tf (q)))Γn ⇔
Γy
Γn
>
qn(qn − Pr(w = n|q, n, tf (q)))
qy(qy − Pr(w = y|q, n, tf (q)))
However, for all values of t,
Γy
Γn > 1, whereas for all values of t,
qn(qn−Pr(w=n|q,n,tf (q)))
qy(qy−Pr(w=y|q,n,tf (q))) < 1, which
implies the desired result. To see that
Γy
Γn > 1, I calculate the reputations for a cutoﬀ point t from each
action and state of the world:
Γy = τ(y, y, δ)− τ(y, n, δ)
=
R 1
.5 2v
2dv+
R t
.5 2v(1−v)dvR 1
.5 2vdv +
R t
.5 2(1− v)dv
−
R 1
.5 2v(1−v)dv+
R t
.5 2v
2dvR 1
.5 2(1− v)dv +
R t
.5 2vdv
=
1
2 t−
1
3 t
3 − 16
t2(2− t)
but
Γn= τ(n, n, δ)− τ(n, y, δ)
=
R 1
t 2v
2dvR 1
t 2vdv
−
R 1
t 2v(1−v)dvR 1
t 2(1− v)dv
=
−t+ t2 + 13 −
1
3 t
3
(1 + t)(1− t)2
and
Γy > Γn ⇐⇒
1
6
−4t4 + 4t3 − t2 + 2t− 1
(t+ 1) t2 (2− t) > 0
which holds for all t > 12 . To see that
qn(qn−Pr(w=n|q,n,t))
qy(qy−Pr(w=y|q,n,t)) < 1 for all t, after simplifying the expressions:
(1− q) (1 + t) (1− t)
t2(1− 2q)2 + 1 + 2t(1− 2q) <
q (2− t) t
t2(1− 2q)2 + 4q2 + 4qt(1− 2q)
30
It is easy to show that if this holds for t = 12 , it holds for all t. When t =
1
2 , this expression is:
3
4(1− q)
(1−2q)2
4 + 2(1− q)
<
3
4q
(1−2q)2
4 + 4q
2 + 2q (1− 2q)
which holds for all q ≥ 12 . This completes the proof.¥
Proof of Proposition 5. We will calculate p˜(n) and show that it increases compared to the case
in which φ = 0, whereas p˜(y) does not change with φ. This means that the utility from n is higher for any
t, and thus tc(q) must decrease.
p˜(n)|φ>0=
(1− qn + qnφ)(Pr(w= y|q, s, t) + Pr(w = n|q, s, t)φ) qnφ
1− qn + qnφ
+
(1− qn + qnφ) Pr(w=n|q, s, t)(1− φ)) + qn(1− φ)qn
The first element is the probability with which the judge is perceived correct, in her eyes, if there is
an appeal. Appeal occurs with probability 1 − qn + qnφ. If the state is y, or if the state is n, and then
with probability φ, the judge is reversed. In this case, the evaluator believes that the state is actually n
with probability qnφ1−qn+qnφ , which is the updated probability given the strategy of the higher court. With
the remaining probability, the judge is aﬃrmed and the evaluator believes then that she is correct with
probability 1. The second element describes the beliefs when no appeal takes place, which are qn.
We will show that p˜(n)|φ>0 > p˜(n)|φ=0 →
(1− qn + qnφ)((Pr(w= y|q, s, t) + Pr(w = n|q, s, t)φ) qnφ
1− qn + qnφ
+Pr(w = n|q, s, t)(1− φ))
+qn(1− φ)qn>Pr(w = n|q, s, t)(1− qn) + q2n ⇐⇒
qnφ(1− qn)− Pr(w=n|q, s, t)φ(1− qn) > 0
which holds by Lemma 6 since qn(s, t) > Pr(w = n|q, s, t).¥
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